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This paper explores the intersection between the construction of a growing 
Islamophobic framing of Muslim communities in Britain, as self-segregated and 
alien to ‘British life and culture; and as a potential source of a terrorist threat to 
the security of all British citizens. It tracks the development of two independent 
central government policies, community cohesion and counter-terrorism, and 
demonstrates the damaging contradictions that result from implementing these two 
policies in parallel within local communities.
Introduction
This paper provides an account of the development of social cohesion and counter-
terrorism policies in the United Kingdom from 2001. It draws upon empirical 
qualitative research undertaken in five metropolitan authorities which revealed 
the unfortunate contradictory consequences of policies developed within different 
ministries in central government having negative effects when implemented at the 
level of the local state (Husband and Alam 2011). In tracking the development and 
implementation of both of these policies this analysis will reveal the consequences 
of both policies being specifically targeted at Muslim communities in Britain, where 
they contributed to the stigmatization of these communities, and to the pervasive 
rise of Islamophobic sentiments in the country. Following major civil disturbances 
in three Northern English cities in 2001, which involved established Muslim 
communities, the central government rapidly developed a community cohesion 
policy that was intended to address the perceived crisis in Muslim-majority 
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relations in inner-city Britain. Thus, from the outset this policy initiative was actively 
focused upon the Muslim population of Britain. This focus was echoed some 
years later following the terrorist bombings in London on 7th July 2005, when the 
generic anxiety that had followed 9/11 in New York was given immediate national 
relevance by the loss of life in central London; and resulted in the rapid introduction 
of new counter-terrorism policies. Local authorities in Britain from that time found 
themselves simultaneously implementing two distinct policies, both of which were 
expressly targeted at Britain’s Muslim populations.
At the level of the local authority it became very apparent that these two policies, 
when implemented in parallel within the same wards of particular townships, 
were inevitably heavily interactive: so much so that the counter-terrorism policies 
seriously jeopardized the credibility of those implementing social cohesion policies. 
This scenario had serious consequences for many of the staff committed to 
implementing these policies who found their personal integrity and professional 
standing put under strain.
In the Beginning – The Emergence of Social 
Cohesion as a National Strategy
The United Kingdom has a very long history of immigration, (Winder 2004), and 
it is one of the ironies of contemporary xenophobic nationalism that it is very 
often expressed in relation to an anguished call to protect Anglo-Saxon British 
culture from new migrant inflows. This Xeno-Racist sentiment (Fekete 2009) 
reveals no awkwardness in the face of the reality that the Angles and Saxons 
were themselves invading forces from fifth and sixth century Northern Europe. 
The British relation with Islam also has a long and diverse history (Ansari 2009; 
Cannadine 2002; Kabbani 1994); but the story to be told here revolves significantly 
around the presence of Muslims in Britain who have predominantly arrived since 
the Second World War. In the post war struggle to rebuild the British economy 
the deliberate recruitment of labour from the British Empire was a core element 
of the national economic strategy. Drawn to service those areas of the economy 
that had become unattractive to the indigenous white labour force, migrant labour 
found itself dispersed to those areas of Britain that were the location for labour 
intensive industrial production. Thus in the major cities of Britain there are to be 
found very substantial concentrations of Muslims, typically located in inner city 
areas. These clusters also represent the residue of distinctive patterns of migration; 
such that although they may be Muslim they will also be members of distinct ethno-
national communities whose settlement led them to develop ethnic communities 
that possessed the critical mass that could sustain an infrastructure of resources 
to meet their dietary, cultural and religious needs (Werbner 2002; Back 1996). 
From the outset discrimination in the labour and housing markets provided external 
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pressure that shaped these communities (Deakin 1970; Hiro 1973; Solomos 2003), 
whilst the ongoing need for a supportive cultural community infrastructure, and for 
a sense of safety and protection from racist harassment, provided a continuing 
internal momentum toward concentration (Phillips et al. 2007). Thus in Tower 
Hamlets in London, in Alum Rock in Birmingham and in inner-city parts of Bradford, 
Burnley and Oldham in the North of England there are to be found communities that 
are, for example, of Bangladeshi, or Pakistani heritage, and from quite particular 
areas within these countries.
In the late 1960s and the 1970s the shared faith of these communities was 
not significant to their perception by the majority population. For example, the 
1970s racist assaults upon these communities was popularly termed ‘paki-
bashing’. However, over the past three decades there have been a number of 
international and national events that have made faith, and Islam in particular, 
a salient criterion for inter-group competition and tension. The Rushdie Affair 
in 1989 over the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses was a major 
international phenomenon (Akhtar 1989; Ruthven 1991). In Britain it had a major 
impact in both making newly salient the presence of Muslims in British cities; but 
just as importantly it was critical in re-siting the Muslim faith in the self perception 
of many members of Britain’s Muslim communities. Not least it revealed the fact 
that Muslims could not rely on liberal anti-racists to share their sense of religious 
offence. It was a break point in the British unified ‘Black Struggle’; and saw the 
emergence of a new politicized Islamic identity in Britain (Modood 1998, 2005). 
Future international events were to further expose the Muslim communities to 
a hostile majority gaze; and this hostility itself then fed the continuing vitality of 
an Islamic sensibility within the context of British ethnic relations. The first Gulf 
War in 1992 (Saeed 2007) resulted in British Muslims being challenged in the 
media, and by political opinion, to prove their commitment to Britain. The rise of 
Islamophobia within British life became a virtually self-fuelling activity that came 
to be placed into the British political arena with the 1997 Runnymede Trust report 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. This report was pivotal in explicitly identifying 
the extent to which anti-Muslim sentiment, and direct hostility toward Muslims, had 
become deeply rooted in Britain. The brief period of national soul searching that 
was occasioned by the publication of this report became eclipsed by the radical 
repositioning of anti-Muslimism following the outrages of 9/11 in New York in 2001. 
At the time this analysis begins with the formation and roll out of the community 
cohesion programme, Muslims in Britain were subject to a public level of scrutiny 
and hostility that made them both vulnerable and defensive. 
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Civil Disturbance and Community Cohesion
Concern with inter-ethnic relations in Britain has a long history, but the impetus 
to the rapid development of the contemporary British concern with ‘Community 
cohesion’ came with the riots in the cities of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 
Northern England in 2001. These disturbances were located preponderantly 
within inner city areas where there were large settled Muslim communities. 
In accounting for these disturbances the official reports that sought to explain 
these events produced a discourse within which the perverse characteristics of 
the Muslim communities themselves figured heavily in explaining the eruption of 
civil disturbances. Specifically these Muslim communities were depicted as being 
characterized by patterns of self-segregation, and were accused of living in parallel 
cultures (see Burnley Task Force 2001; Oldham Independent Panel Review 2001; 
Ouseley 2001 and the Community Cohesion Independent Review Team [the 
Cantle report] 2001). This focus upon the supposed dysfunctional characteristics 
of the minority population in explaining the breakdown of civil relations between 
the majority and minority populations has a history in British political discourse 
and was widely employed in accounting for civil disturbances involving African-
Caribbean communities in the 1970s-80s (Gilroy 1987). Finding the ‘problem’ 
within the minority ethnic communities very conveniently displaced the focus from 
the structural reproduction of inequalities, and from the role of racism, which may 
implicate the majority population in creating the circumstances in which civil unrest 
becomes a realistic occurrence. Nor was such thinking unique to accounting for 
stresses in ethnic relations, as Levitas’ (2005) account of New Labour’s policy 
and philosophy surrounding social exclusion and citizenship reveals. In particular 
the moral underclass discourse she identified as focusing upon the moral and 
behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves points to a generic ‘blaming-
the-victim’ discourse which allows the majority community to rehearse their own 
virtues whilst stigmatizing the excluded. The 2001 focus upon the ‘self-segregation’ 
of British Muslims provided just such a convenient explanatory account that 
displaced any focus from the failures of state policies.
The riots of 2001 provided an opportunity for a period of political reflection 
on the trajectory of British multiculturalism. Across Europe a process of retreat 
from an optimistic commitment to a variety of forms of progressive multiculturalism 
was already underway, and the events of 2001 provided an opportunity for the 
hegemonic elite to rehearse their established credentials for decency and tolerance 
(Husband, 2005, 2011), in the context of their perceived betrayal by the supposedly 
unassiminable inner city Muslim youth who had become the focus of concern 
following the riots. The exceptionally punitive sentences that were handed out to 
the convicted rioters (see Bagguley and Hussein 2008) were themselves indicative 
of the sense of aggrieved outrage felt by the ‘benevolent’ majority. The response to 
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the riots of 2001 must be set in the context of what had by then been five decades 
of the development of British multiculturalism.
Tolerance / Rights and Policy
Since the initial post war migration of ‘coloured immigrants’ into Britain, successive 
British governments have developed a complementary spiral of policies which 
have generated on the one hand increasingly draconian immigration policies, 
with the attendant stigmatization of immigrants and asylum seekers, and on the 
other the development of a cumulative body of anti-discriminatory legislation which 
has established a pervasive infrastructure of routine anti-discriminatory practice 
throughout local authority practice and in areas of public life (Husband 2005). The 
populist politics of anti-immigrant policy has been a central plank in party political 
competition for electoral advantage by appealing to the Xenophobic and racist 
sentiments that are deeply entrenched in the British social imaginary (Back et al. 
2002; Fekete 2009).The importance of this process has been the normalization of 
anti-immigrant sentiment within the mainstream parties of British politics. The far 
right movements of the National Front, the British National Party or more recently 
the English Defence League have provided a convenient ‘extreme racist’ fringe 
against which the majority of the population, and the major centrist parties in 
Government (Labour and Conservative), have been able to rehearse their own 
moderation and tolerance. The orchestrated celebration of British tolerance has 
in this context been a key trope in the construction of a positive national self 
image which has provided a supportive framework for the defence of British 
multiculturalism. A critical discursive strategy that has been facilitated by this self 
image has been the deployment of what Bloomaert and Verschuren (1998) called 
the ‘limits of tolerance’ discourse wherein, in the name of preserving our national 
capacity for tolerance, we must of necessity have strict border policies and limit the 
claims made by immigrants (see Husband 2010). A multicultural policy developed 
on the basis of a commitment to tolerance must of necessity create a skewed 
orientation to a commitment to minority ethnic rights. For those to be tolerated, by 
definition have some stigma that must be tolerated and are being given access to 
resources to which they have no absolute right. Consequently it is reasonable for 
the tolerant to expect the tolerated to be grateful for the largesse that has been 
accorded them (see Husband 1994 and also Brown 2006).
The development of British anti-discriminatory legislation and policy has, 
however, been progressively built upon a foundational commitment to human rights 
principles. Thus policies that seek to guarantee the substantive citizenship rights 
of minority ethnic residents, who are preponderantly British citizens, does not need 
to invoke majority tolerance: it is based upon a claim to a common basket of rights 
available to all. Consequently minority ethnic citizens should feel no pressure to 
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be grateful for being granted the privileges that they have as of right as British 
citizens. Additionally in the context of an epoch where the ‘politics of difference’ 
(Taylor 1992) have become routinely expressed as interest groups seek to claim 
their collective rights; then minority activism in support of legitimate rights (whether 
in terms of gender, sexual preference, faith or ethnicity), has challenged the benign 
self image of the tolerant majority.
Over the last 60 years the United Kingdom has developed a de facto 
infrastructure of routinised anti-discriminatory policy that has been embedded in 
local authority and business practice. Whilst the language of ‘political correctness’ 
clearly identifies the recurrent resistance to this state of affairs (Husband 2010), it 
is nevertheless the case that British politicians have felt, with some justification, 
that compared to many other European countries Britain has a credible record 
in addressing the challenge of diversity within its population. At the same time 
NGOs and minority ethnic organizations have sustained a prolonged critique of 
the failures of this practice. High profile public enquiries such as the MacPherson 
Report (1999) into the police handling of the murder of a Black young man, and the 
Runneymede Trust Report (1997) into the growth of Islamophobia in Britain, have 
maintained a nervous defensiveness amongst Government departments about 
their virtue in delivering an equitable multicultural service.
Thus the tension between a self congratulatory tolerance and a troubled 
principled commitment to delivering anti-discriminatory services to all has been 
played out against a cumulative normalization of anti-immigrant sentiment as a 
core element of party political rhetoric. Consequently it is in this context that the 
perceived ‘self segregation’ of Muslim communities and their pursuit of ‘parallel 
lives’ has its discursive power. Their perceived unwillingness to become properly 
British is seen as an insulting rejection of the tolerant commitment of the majority 
society in seeking to address their needs. The very visible resistance to anti-
discriminatory practices in the tabloid press, with their rehearsal of the lunacy 
of political correctness, has been nurtured over the last decade by the national 
press coverage of the extensive retreat from earlier forms of multiculturalism in 
other European countries. The reasonableness of other countries strictures on the 
cultural practices of their immigrants are compared with the continuing abuse of 
our tolerance as Britain sustains a commitment to minority rights. In this discursive 
environment the riots of 2011 were seen as a provocative challenge to the extant 
policies of British multiculturalism and became an additional trigger in pushing 
British policy into a more assertively assimilationist direction. Again this pressure 
toward conformity was not unique to the domain of inter-ethnic relations. As Flint 
(2009) pointed out, the ‘colonising of civility’ by the government, that was integral 
to the development of Community Cohesion, was part of a longer trajectory of the 
state seeking to domesticate the behavior of its citizenry.
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The Community Cohesion policy that was developed by the Government 
in response to the riots of 2001 were specifically targeted at Britain’s Muslim 
communities because of their ‘self segregation’, and was from the outset seen as 
being distinct from the more generic issue of social cohesion that had wide policy 
visibility in Europe and the United States. In the words of Cantle, who was central 
in developing this policy:
‘social cohesion’ has tended to be used more broadly and aligned particularly with 
general socioeconomic factors, whereas ‘community cohesion’ has emerged as a 
more specific term to describe the societal features which are based on identifiable 
communities defined by faith or ethnicity, rather than social class. (Cantle 2008, 50.) 
Thus in its formulation community cohesion was a policy initiative that directly 
responded to the wide popular and political concern that followed upon the 2001 
riots (Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Bagguley and Hussain 2008). In this context 
the policy was from the outset ‘racialized’ (Murji and Solomos 2005) and focused 
specifically upon the faith; and problematic implications of these communities’ 
commitment to their culture and identity. It should also be remembered that the 
development of the community cohesion policies in the United Kingdom took place 
in the context of a world radically transformed by the events of 9/11 in the United 
States. The salience of Islam as marker of difference had taken on a significance 
that invoked notions of threat and inalienable difference that changed the resonance 
of Islam in the political and popular understanding of diversity (Modood 2005). The 
concerns with the ‘self segregation’ of Muslim communities was therefore already 
coloured by the ubiquitous fetid suspicions channeled through Huntington’s ‘clash 
of civilisations’ thesis (1993, 1996) and the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’. Not only was 
the continued reproduction of distinctly Muslim communities a perceived insult to 
British multicultural openness, but additionally what they might be doing in their 
communities became part of a wider anxiety.
The core of the policy agenda of community cohesion was an essentially 
assimilationist drive to make them more British1. The focus upon the cultural and 
behavioral practices of Britain’s Muslim communities, particularly in the inner city 
concentrations, provided a potential repertoire of interventions that would reassert 
Britain’s tolerant credentials in seeking to accommodate difference (by eradicating 
it). At the same time, this focus drew a convenient veil over those structural 
processes that reproduced the social exclusion of Muslim communities, on the 
bases of class and race, that were the bedrock on which community defensive 
boundary maintenance were likely to be both necessary and legitimate. As McGhee 
(2003, 393) noted:
1 Of course in the process of rolling out this policy one of the perverse consequences was the 
revelation that there exists no coherent normative definition of what it means to be British (see also 
Flint 2009)
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By focusing in the main on opening up channels of communication, on generating a 
culture of respect through attempting to encourage commonality – in place of division, 
what is observable in community cohesion discourses and programmes is a partial 
repression of ‘conflict’ achieved through discursively placing unwanted characteristics 
outside of the debate.
Wrapped in the broader mantle of New Labour’s flirtation with communitarianism, 
and shaped by New Labour’s commitment to equality of opportunity rather than 
substantive equality, community cohesion as a policy was an explicit critique 
of the current articulation of Muslim communities with wider British life which 
unambiguously placed the responsibility for change at the door of the Muslim 
community. Specifically drawing upon the language of social capital, which whilst 
intellectually contested, held vogue status as policy discourse (Field 2003) it was 
the bad bonding capital of these communities that had to be replaced by more 
acceptable bridging capital. At the level of the local state the rollout of community 
cohesion policies essentially involved drawing upon traditional community work 
skills in engaging with Muslim communities.
Counter-terrorism: Contest and Prevent
If the riots of 2001 were the trigger for the development of community cohesion 
policies in the United Kingdom then undoubtedly it was the bombings in London 
of July 2005 which acted as the trigger for the urgent development of Britain’s 
anti-terrorism policies. The generic concerns with Islam and terrorism that had 
become articulated with a significantly robust British capacity for Islamophobia 
(Runneymede Trust 1997; Smith et al. 2004) was given a quantum shift with the 
emergence of home grown bombers. The essence of terrorism is that anyone 
can be a potential target; and the perceived reality of Islamisist radicalization was 
that any Muslim could be the next bomber. This was a perception given some 
credence by the ‘normality’ of the individuals who came to be convicted of terrorist 
offences. In the populist anxieties of the time the sentiment was likely to be that 
‘We know who the Muslims are and where they live’; but, ‘We cannot know which 
individual is the radicalized enemy we should fear.’ This was the perfect scenario 
for the development of paranoia and for the seemingly reasonable scapegoating 
of all Muslims. Something of the psychology of the time is sketched explicitly in the 
Government White Paper of 2006: Countering International Terrorism: The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy, which stated that:
The Government assesses that the current threat in the UK from Islamist terrorism is 
serious and sustained. British citizens also face the threat of terrorist attacks when 
abroad. Overall we judge that the scale of the threat is potentially still increasing and 
is not likely to diminish significantly for some years... as the tragic attacks of 7th July, 
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2005 have shown, it is not possible to eliminate completely the threat of terrorist attacks 
in this country. (H.M. Government 2006, 8).
This explicitly frank assertion of the states’ limited ability to guarantee the 
safety of its citizens was by no means purely an exceptional burst of honesty by a 
government ministry, for an inherent feature of counter-terrorism strategies is that 
the general public must be persuaded to accept the intrusion into their civil liberties 
and freedoms that is attendant upon the development of intrusive surveillance 
strategies. Thus it is an intrinsic element of counter-terrorism that the public should 
be made self-consciously aware of their continuing vulnerability to terrorist attack 
in order to persuade them to support the counter-terrorist strategies developed 
in the name of their safety. Indeed following the bombings of 7th July 2005, the 
security services sustained a practice of keeping the public sense of threat at a 
high level: often on the basis of evidence that questionably supported the risk level 
that was declared. As the House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on 
Human Rights noted in their report of March 2010:
Since September 11th 2001 the Government has continuously justified many of its 
counter-terrorism measures on the basis that there is a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation. We question whether the country has been in such a state for 
more than eight years. This permanent state of emergency inevitably has a deleterious 
effect on public debate about the justification for counter-terrorism measures (JCHR 
2010, 3).
In pursuing this aim of sustaining a popular sense of threat the government 
were amply assisted by the media in what Moring (2012, in this issue) has called 
‘an incestuous spiral of mutual interest’ .Terrorism is highly dependent upon 
publicity to achieve its impact, namely the contagious spread of fear amongst a 
large population; the government has an interest in sustaining an awareness of 
threat in order to legitimate its intrusive counter-terrorism strategies; and the media 
has a fascination with the terrorist and with terrorism because they have such a 
close fit with news values, the sensationalism of infotainment, and the casting and 
reproduction of spectacle (Taylor and Harris 2008). 
The extensive reach of counter-terrorism strategies into the fabric of daily life that 
followed the July 7th bombings did not emerge from a policy vacuum. The United 
Kingdom had a history of counter-terrorism policy that had been extensively refined 
during ‘the troubles’ with the IRA in Northern Ireland; including the Provisional IRA 
bombing in Birmingham in November 1974 which resulted in 24 deaths and injuries to 
nearly 200 persons. Following this outrage the then Home Secretary rushed through 
Parliament a Prevention of Terrorism Bill which he admitted included provisions 
‘which had now become acceptable although they would not hitherto have been 
so’ (Jenkins 1991, 393). A similar process followed the events of 9/11/2001 when 
an extensive Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was rapidly passed through 
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Parliament; elements of which were in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Indeed, in the wake of 9/11 there has been a progressive retreat 
from an unambiguous commitment to human rights principles across democratic 
governments; with human rights becoming negotiable in relation to the pragmatic 
interests of security. (Wilson 2005; Gearty 2007; Bonney 2008). Thus, for example, 
a 2010 Report of the House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on 
Human Rights provided a distressing account of the struggle of the British judiciary 
to counter the British Government’s attempts to circumvent international human 
rights principles. Hennessy (2007, 6) in talking of the development in Britain of a 
‘new protective state’ of intelligence and security noted that
Parliament, public and the press have to yet to appreciate fully its scope and magnitude-
in-the round or its long-term significance to our systems of government and the kind of 
country we are.
The development of counter-terrorism policies and practice throughout the 
United Kingdom following 9/11 and 7/7/2005 in London have been marked by an 
erosion of commitment to human rights principles and by a pragmatic prioritization 
of security over civil liberties. A key element of the analysis below will be to 
demonstrate the intrusive impact of counter-terrorism policies upon the attempts to 
roll out the parallel policy of community cohesion. First it is necessary to sketch the 
elements of the counter-terrorism policy developed post 7/7.
Whilst anti-terrorist legislation continues to evolve, the core structure was 
clearly laid out in Countering International Terrorism (2006). The Government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy, outlined in that document, was called CONTEST, and 
had a structure with four elements at its heart: prevention, pursuit, protection and 
preparation. 
The ‘four P’s’ provided a distribution of responsibilities for addressing the differing 
issues that are real and potential in the context of contemporary international 
terrorism. As the updated policy of CONTEST II (Home Office 2009, 13) succinctly 
phrased it:
CONTEST is intended to be a comprehensive strategy: Work on Pursue and Prevent 
reduces the threat from terrorism: work on Protect and Prepare reduces the UK’s 
vulnerability to attack.
‘Prepare’ addresses the challenge of ensuring an adequate organisational and 
resource capacity to be able to address the consequences of a terrorist attack. 
This is an agenda that was given particular emphasis by the inadequate response 
capability that was fulsomely demonstrated in the case of the ‘triple whammy’ of 
the British state’s lack of preparedness for dealing with the flooding and fuel crises 
of 2000, and the foot and mouth crisis of 2001. Needless to say an adequate 
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preparation for terrorist assault is contingent upon an accurate understanding of 
the potential nature and scale of the terrorist attacks and their immediate and long-
term consequences. Thus intelligence gathering is an essential foundation for 
adequate preparation and planning.
‘Protect’ addresses the protection of the public, key national services and British 
overseas interests. As we have noted above the long history of responding to Irish 
Republican Terrorism provided a significant basis for the development of current 
policy and practice: including the use of CCTV cameras and extensive surveillance.
‘Pursue’ addresses the challenge of pursing terrorists and those who sponsor 
them. This agenda is highly dependent upon co-operation between intelligence 
agencies at home and abroad. Not only is ‘intelligence’ critical to this task, but 
where, for example, pursuit involves action across different state jurisdictions, 
diplomatic and legal matters will need to be addressed.
‘Prevent’ is the area of policy that is most central to our concerns here. Although 
it would be naïve and unhelpful to believe that this agenda can be understood in 
its operation independently of the other ‘three P’s’, Mottram (2007, 50) provides us 
with a succinct outline:
The ‘Prevent’ element of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy identifies three 
principal strands of effort whose breadth illustrates the extent of the challenge:
1. Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural problems in 
the UK and overseas, such as inequalities and discrimination.
2. Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become 
terrorists – changing the environment in which seeking to turn others towards 
extremism and terrorist violence can operate.
3. Engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe 
can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute 
these ideas to do so. 
In discussing these three elements of ‘Prevent’, Mottram2 argued that tackling 
disadvantage and supporting reform ‘is a huge task with uncertain payback in 
counter-terrorist terms’ (ibid., 50). In justifying this assertion he argued that in 
the UK those who became drawn into terrorism were not themselves particularly 
disadvantaged in educational or employment terms. However, whilst this may be 
true of the individual terrorist, it is hardly true of the communities from which they 
are drawn; and on whose behalf they may feel aggrieved. Nor does it address the 
transnational sensitivity of many Muslims who have a sense of affinity with the 
marginalised and oppressed experiences of their co-religionists elsewhere in the 
2 Mottram was the previous Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator of TIDO [Terrorism, international 
Defence and Overseas] Strategy and Delivery, and subsequently Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, 
Security and Resilience in the Cabinet Office.
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world. But whatever the reasoning, the de facto expression of Prevent in practice, 
as with community cohesion, focused more particularly on the internal dynamics of 
Britain’s Muslim communities than it did upon their structural situation.
In its initial roll out, and in particular with the funding stream identified with 
the Pathfinder programme of community based initiatives, the Prevent agenda 
experienced strong resistance from Muslim communities and from local authority 
staff who saw it as Islamophobic and likely to undermine their existing relationship 
with Muslim communities. As we shall see below these fears were substantially 
realised by the subsequent events. A key feature of the ‘New Preventive State’ 
was the extensive development of inter-agency working: both between government 
departments and with other organisations in civil society. With the priority on 
intelligence gathering that lay at the heart of the counter-terrorism strategy, this 
seamless linkage across departments and agencies came to mean that members 
of the Muslim communities in Britain could not be sure that any member of a local 
authority, whether school teacher, community worker, or youth worker was not 
explicitly or implicitly involved in a process of surveillance. The reach of CONTEST 
was such that there was a widespread expectation upon anyone interacting with 
members of the Muslim community, that they should monitor the behaviour of the 
people they met and report any ‘unusual or suspicious’ behaviour3. Indeed it also 
meant that employees of the local state could not themselves be sure whether 
information that they routinely gathered as part of their professional practice did 
not at some point get passed onto the counter intelligence agencies. Thus the 
securitization of everyday life had been extensively extended through the pervasive 
reach of the counter-terrorism structure. Significantly this process had been 
developed within the political discourses of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and the ‘War 
on Terror’ in which Islam and Muslims had been extensively defined as an alien 
presence in ‘the West’; and Muslims specifically were seen as an enemy within. In 
the British case this specifically included an extensive rehearsal of their collective 
failure to become ‘properly British’, and of their ‘self segregation’ in supposed inner 
city ghettoes. Framing Muslim communities within this script, which rendered them 
both ‘other’ and detached from the wider society, provided a context in which the 
fetid anxieties surrounding potential ‘Jihadist’ outrages became all too reasonable. 
This contributed to both the increase in Islamophobia in the majority population, 
and an increased identification with the Islamic faith within the settled minority 
ethnic communities in Britain. A highly critical report of the Communities and Local 
Government Committee of the House of Commons, entitled Preventing Violent 
Extremism, summarised evidence it had taken on the operation of Prevent by 
concluding, amongst other things, that: 
3 In principle, this was an expectation that also applied to university lecturers in their dealings with 
students.
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the single focus on Muslims in Prevent has been unhelpful. We conclude that any 
programme which focuses solely on one section of a community is stigmatising, 
potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that no section of a population exists 
in isolation from others (CLGC 2010, 3).
Thus two policies emanating form central government both had placed Britain’s 
Muslim communities as ‘the problem’ at the heart of each policy. This both fed 
into and fed off the wider discourse of Islamophobia in Britain that had extensively 
developed following 9/11. 
Community Cohesion and Prevent in Practice
A study carried out to track the roll out of these two policies in tandem within 
five major local authorities interviewed the senior managers responsible for each 
policy, the elected councillors who held the brief for these policies, and some of 
the operational staff responsible for implementing the policies (see Husband and 
Alam 2011). The findings reported below are drawn from that study and provide an 
insight into the insidious penetration of counter-terrorism measures into other parts 
of contemporary urban life in Britain.
Political Resistance to the Introduction of Prevent
The Prevent agenda was, as we have seen above, a rapid and specific response 
to the bombings in London of 7th July 2005; and had a specific focus upon the 
Muslim communities in Britain. It was the political and operational implications of 
this focus which create a strong resistance to it across the five authorities studied. 
The explicit targeting of the Muslim communities was frequently seen as a form a 
collective stigmatisation of British Muslims which was unacceptable. Particularly 
given the ubiquitous ramifications of Prevent in terms of legitimating, and requiring, 
the extensive surveillance of Muslim communities, local politicians and staff had 
sound reasons for anticipating the negative effects of this policy on ethnic relations 
within their area. It was the capacity of the local officers and councillors to have 
an empathetic understanding of the impact of this policy, and its accompanying 
rhetoric, on local Muslim communities that fuelled this resistance. As one senior 
manger phrased it:
If we take the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda, after 7/7 the government was, if 
we’re honest, pretty close to panic; understandably so. All of a sudden we – supposedly 
– had these potential terrorists all over the place in our communities. And some of 
the language used was pretty strange to say the least... Something had happened 
which had shocked Government into needing to react. But that reaction, because of the 
anxiety and because the information stream the government had at the time was from 
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the security services and from the police intelligence, it was security based intelligence: 
we got a very, very narrow view of the approach to preventing violent extremism.
This narrow view was essentially a focus upon the Muslim communities by 
central government which was supported with a rhetoric and concrete practices 
which fed popular suspicion of all Muslims following 9/11 in New York and 7/7 in 
London. It was a blunt policy response which quite directly fed the Islamophobic 
sentiments that were very salient at the time. Reflecting this reality one senior 
councillor stated that: ‘When the document came out from the Home Office I was 
aghast. I threw it out. I said we not having this. It was racist. Quite clearly racist.’
Local staff and councillors were sustained in their critique of Prevent by the 
direct feedback they received from their local communities. As a senior staff 
member said:
I think that everyone felt uncomfortable with it. We got quite a lot of complaints from 
members of the community, not just the Muslim community, but community reps who 
were part of our local area agreement structure.
Contradictions between Prevent and Community Cohesion
It was apparent across the interviews carried out in this study that for many 
individuals the Prevent agenda was seen as being deeply flawed in its conception 
and damaging in its implications. The damaging potential of the Prevent agenda at 
the local level owed a lot to the fact that the inter-agency working that had become 
normative in local authority practice meant that both community cohesion and the 
Prevent initiatives were increasingly incapable of being discerned as different by 
either the staff implementing them and the Muslim communities who were targeted 
by them. As one manager tellingly commented: ‘I could imagine that there’s nothing 
that you can do in social cohesion that can’t be perceived as – a front for Prevent.’
The intrusive nature of counter-terrorist surveillance meant, as was noted 
above, that the routine access of local authority personnel into peoples’ homes 
and community organisations had become a potential opportunity for intelligence 
gathering. This lead a senior councillor to assert that:
When you are required as elected representatives to gain the respect … of the 
community and drive through values: the values of education, care of the elderly, 
standards in life – a clean environment –basically promoting and encouraging the 
greater well-being of the populace; to also be the Big Brother that is actually spying on 
part of the community – then there is a contradiction.
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The contradiction between the empathetic engagement with communities 
that is at the heart of community development and social cohesion work, and the 
intrusive and fundamentally suspicious mindset of counter-terrorism work resulted 
in considerable stress for the staff who were required to implement these policies. 
Not least because the resentment felt towards the Prevent agenda by very many 
members of Muslim communities served to undermine the hard won trust between 
these communities and local authority staff that had been built up of previous years; 
points revealed by the following quotes:
It’s like you’re talking with a forked tongue. That’s the thing and the community’s not 
stupid. They know what the public agenda is, what the Government agenda is and they 
know that their Muslim community is under the spotlight: under the heat. (A councillor).
So of course it’s a difficult situation: information gathering/collecting – then are we then 
a reporting centre? Are we then working outside our own remit, you know? And what’s 
somebody going to do with the information? So how much control and confidentiality? 
All those issues arose. (A member of the fieldwork staff)
The contradictions between implementing social cohesion policies and those 
of Prevent were felt nowhere more acutely than by Muslim members of staff in 
these local authorities. Since both community cohesion and Prevent were targeted 
at Muslim communities, the Muslim staff in these authorities could be seen as 
possessing a unique competence to act as a bridge between the local state and 
the Muslim communities in the area. The Muslim staff were acutely aware of this 
possibility and some of them were very explicit about seeking to limit the extent 
to which their standing in their local communities might be compromised by 150 
fronting  for Prevent. As one worker said:
The thing about it is I’ve been very clear in terms of, you know, where I fit into it. If it 
means I will lose my reputation, then I will not get involved in it ... and there have been 
a number of occasions where I have [said], I’m not attending that meeting... and I’ve 
been criticised by senior management. 
Another reflected upon the impact of Prevent upon their working environment:
I think that this is probably the most challenging time that we as officers have ever 
experienced, or ever perhaps will experience; you know, given the delivery or 
implementation of Prevent. 
While another observed that:
There is going to be that level of suspicion, you know. Anyone who works with 
communities now, on Community Cohesion or whatever, it all comes back to Prevent.
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As this final quote illustrates, some Muslim professionals have responded to the 
contaminating potential of Prevent work by seeking to exclude themselves from it:
I think that there is a lot of pressure, and to be honest that’s why I’ve shied away from 
being involved with it; because it’s loaded. I can’t go straight faced to my community 
and say, I’m here to help you. I know what they want me to do. It’s like working as an 
informant, a spy, at the same time. It goes against my morals to do that. 
The experience of the Muslim staff provides a sensitive litmus test to reveal 
the ways in which the Prevent agenda has become intrusive across a whole range 
of local authority practice. The essential logics of counter-terrorism follow the 
inherent purpose of terrorism itself, which is to permeate everyday life with fear 
of attack , and with its complement; a sustained suspicion of potential terrorists. 
The scapegoating of the Muslim communities of Britain’s inner cities produced a 
legitimating rhetoric in support of intrusive intelligence gathering and surveillance 
which was widely supported in the British media. It was not, however, received with 
the same sang froid by the Muslim communities themselves who saw this as a form 
of collective punishment and a denial of their generic membership of the larger 
community of British citizens.
The Local State and Central Government
It became apparent in tracking the implementation of the Community Cohesion 
policy in the five local authorities that there was a considerable dissatisfaction with 
the way in which central government sought to micro-manage the implementation 
of the cohesion agenda. The staff responsible for this policy at the level of the 
local state found themselves to be the target for a positive blizzard of guidance 
instructions and a succession of consultation documents and other communications 
from Whitehall. The matter was complicated by the fact that many of the initiatives 
carried out at the local level under the name of Prevent were very similar to the 
initiatives being carried out by staff involved in Community Cohesion. They both 
drew very heavily on traditional community development approaches and often 
employed colleagues, who in the context of inter-agency working, sometimes found 
themselves unclear about the boundaries between these two policies. Ironically 
the overload of central government communications resulted in a situation where 
the only rational response for the local staff was the exercise of local discretion in 
making sense of the overload of information with which they were confronted. This 
exercise of local discretion was facilitated by the existence of a cohort of staff who 
were confident of their existentially grounded knowledge of the local communities 
they served, and of their professional competence to address the challenges with 
which they were presented following the bombings of 7/7 and the rapid escalation 
of the concern with the terrorist threat. A corollary of this management of the flood 
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of guidance from central government was the development of a critical voicing of 
the perceived ignorance of the bureaucrats in Whitehall who were seen as inventing 
policy in the absence of a grounded knowledge of local situations. This sense of 
grievance toward the politicians and bureaucrats in Westminster was enhanced by 
strong resentments following the visits of such persons to the local communities 
where their comments and interventions were frequently seen as crass, and even 
damaging to the efforts of local staff to implement the policies for which these 
visitors were supposedly responsible. Anecdotes of such visits were rehearsed 
with some relish as means of celebrating both local competence and 152 Southern 
stupidities.
In coming to an understanding of the development of community cohesion and 
counter-terrorism policies, and indeed of the wider securitization of urban life in 
Britain, it will always be important to keep in mind the distinctive role of the local 
state in interpreting the edicts of central government developed through legislation 
and rolled out through policy directives. (see Hancock, this issue and Huysmans 
2006). As seen above the local states’ political response to the initial definition 
of Prevent was robust and highly critical. This capacity for resistance to central 
government is a consequence of the vitality of strong local and regional identities, a 
relatively stable professional work force, and a conviction that both local councillors 
and local staff have a sound knowledge of their local patch. Such a strong sense 
of commitment to the locality and pride in their professionalism and local insight 
provided a strong foundation for the outrage and resistance that was expressed 
around the introduction of Prevent; where Chief Executives, local councillors and 
staff formed a strong consensus of opposition to the explicit singling out of the 
Muslim communities as the problematic target for action.
Conclusion
The British experience of the simultaneous implementation of social cohesion and 
counter-terrorism measures may have much about it that is distinctively British: 
but it also provides a case study which may reasonably be expected to inform 
the likely dynamics in many other national contexts. Both policies emerged in the 
context of a long established national predisposition toward ethnic diversity. In the 
British case this included a long history of 152 coloured thinking  which informed 
a changing , but sustained capacity for racism. (Solomos 2003). To this could be 
added a Xenophobic response to the arrival of new immigrants which had become 
a leitmotif in party political competition for the popular vote. And, in the last decade 
Britain had seen a retreat from a well established commitment to its own form of 
multiculturalism. These are features of national policies and individual sentiments 
which can be tracked in other European countries; and in multiethnic societies 
elsewhere.( Fekete 2009 and Lentin and Titley 2011.)
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Claims to promote cohesion in nation states typically result in an exercise in 
rehearsing a sense of the claimed distinctive national identity, and its attendant 
culture, to which the Other is expected to demonstrate not only a sense of affiliation; 
but also a cultural accommodation. Thus when Others become perceived as an 
alien presence that requires measures to aid their social cohesion into the fabric of 
society as a whole, it is very often their difference which becomes the anvil upon 
which new policy is beaten out. In the British case following the events of 2001 it 
was British Muslim’s, (who were very preponderantly established British citizens), 
who became the explicit target for community cohesion policies. Their difference 
was stridently asserted in the political discourse that claimed to have identified 
the problem in their self segregation and their tendency to live in parallel cultures. 
This process was itself framed by the global engagement in the polarising clash of 
civilizations imbroglio, which fed an Islamophobia for which Britain was particularly 
historically equipped. Other countries have their own history of Orientalism and 
their own histories of relations with Islam (e.g Marchand 2008), and consequently 
their own capacity to stereotype and marginalise their Muslim populations.
Terrorism is a challenge in the contemporary world, and states have both a 
duty and a right to develop policies which will seek to limit the potential threat 
to their citizens. A key question, however, lies with the proportionality and the 
reasonableness of the policy response. In the British case Contest and Prevent 
were developed with the Muslim communities explicitly identified as the principle 
target of counter-terrorism policies. In the first wave of Prevent majority ethnic far 
right extremism was barely taken into account; and with the modest subsequent 
refinements to Prevent the adjustment of focus and rhetoric has not been substantial. 
That the same Muslim communities living in specific towns should be so explicitly 
identified simultaneously within two distinct major areas of policy, as a double threat 
to the British state, was a lamentable expression of the Orientalism and Islamophobia 
noted above. Their earlier identification through community cohesion as a cultural 
threat to the culture and civility of British life provided a most unfortunate framing 
discourse for the later emergence of their definition as the perceived inevitable 
sources of Britain’s future home grown bombers. The logics of community cohesion 
and of counter-terrorism appeared to emerge from autonomous silos of politicians 
and Whitehall advisors who self-segregated themselves from each other and lived 
in parallel institutional cultures. Each policy had its own ministerial imperatives and 
its own organizational capacity to set performance indicators, establish a hierarchy 
of management and seek to impose a performance at the local level that matched 
the political investment made in these policies as political agendas. It was ironic 
that the highly developed level of interagency working at the local level, that had 
been developed over the recent years, should have provided such a regrettably 
fertile organizational context in which the lack of joined up thinking between central 
government departments should be so dysfunctionally expressed in practice at 
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the local level. At the level of the local authority the contradictions between the 
intrusive policies of Prevent and Contest, and the supposedly progressive policies 
of community cohesion, were readily apparent.
With both community cohesion and counter-terrorism there was an apparent 
political unwillingness to engage with the structural and attitudinal forces within 
British life that might have contributed to the demographic structure of British cities, 
and to the development of an increased commitment to Islamic identities. British 
foreign policy could not meaningfully be isolated from any understanding of the 
development of Muslim thinking in Britain; and the structural reproduction of class 
inequalities could not be erased by developing community cohesion policies which 
aspired to ignore the intersection of class and ethnicity in determining individuals  life 
experiences in Britain. The story told above is as much about a political retreat from 
a concern with equality as it is about a failure of imagination and insight resulting in 
the damaging introduction of two contradictory policies. Both community cohesion 
and Prevent were policies essentially designed to address symptoms of different 
aspects of societal stress; rather than making explicit the underlying causes, and 
honestly seeking to politically engage with them. That was not an option within the 
ideology of the times; nor would be it be now.
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